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Abstract 
The paper explores the role social network capital might play in facilitating poor agents’ 
escape from poverty traps. We model endogenous network formation among households 
heterogeneously endowed with both traditional and social network capital who make 
investment and technology choices over time in the absence of financial markets and 
faced with multiple production technologies featuring different fixed costs and returns. 
We show that social network capital can serve as either a complement to or a substitute 
for productive assets in facilitating some poor households’ escape from poverty. However, 
the voluntary nature of costly social network formation also creates both involuntary and 
voluntary exclusionary mechanisms that impede some poor households’ efforts to exit 
poverty. The ameliorative potential of social networks therefore depends fundamentally 
on the underlying wealth distribution in the economy. In some settings, targeted public 
transfers to the poor can crowd-in private resources by inducing new social links that the 
poor can exploit to escape from poverty. 
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Social Network Capital, Economic Mobility and Poverty Traps 
 
1. Introduction  
The persistent poverty widely observed in developing countries has motivated much 
research on poverty traps into which households may fall and have difficulty escaping. 
The fundamental feature of most poverty trap models centers on the existence of financial 
market imperfections that impede investment in productive assets or technology, and thus 
prevent households with poor initial endowments from reaching higher-level equilibria in 
systems characterized by multiple equilibria.1 Meanwhile, a parallel literature emphasizes 
multiple pathways through which social network capital might facilitate productivity 
growth, technology adoption and access to (informal) finance.2 However, various studies 
also document the existence of exclusionary mechanism that can effectively prevent some 
poor from utilizing social networks to promote growth.3 Advances in understanding the 
nature and limits of social network capital formation could offer insights into whether and 
how poor households might avoid or escape poverty traps. There have been some notable 
recent efforts to make these links explicit.4  
This paper further explores the intersection between poverty traps and social 
network by studying the mechanisms by which endogenous social network capital can 
facilitate or impede poor households’ escape from persistent poverty.  We especially seek 
to provide a theoretical foundation for the quite mixed empirical effects of social network 
capital on poor households’ well-being.  While some empirical studies – e.g., Narayan and 
Pritchett (1999) – find that social network capital effectively serves as a substitute for real 
capital in mediating economic mobility in many economies, others, such as Adato et al. 
(2006) and Mogues and Carter (2005), suggest that accumulation of social network capital 
proves ineffective for households at the bottom of the economic pyramid in highly 
                                                 
 
1 Examples include Loury (1981), Banerjee and Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Dercon (1998), 
and Mookherjee and Ray (2002, 2003).  See Azariadis and Stachurski (forthcoming) or Carter and Barrett 
(2006) for helpful reviews of key threads in the poverty traps literature. 
2 Dasgupta and Serageldin (2000) and Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) offer excellent reviews. 
3 For example, Adato et al. (2006), Mogues and Carter (2005) and Santos and Barrett (2006), among others.  
4 See, for example, the recent volumes by Barrett (2005) and Bowles et al. (2006) and the December 2005 
special issue of the Journal of Economic Inequality on “Social Groups and Economic Inequality”.   
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polarized economies. Why might endogenous social network formation help some poor 
households but not others? 
The basic structure and intuition of our model runs as follows. Households 
heterogeneously endowed with privately owned capital assets and social network capital – 
from endowed (e.g., parents’) social networks – choose production technologies, 
consumption, and investment in assets and in social relationships with others in the 
economy (that confer future social network capital) over multiple periods so as to 
maximize their lifetime utility. We assume that social networks are costly to establish and 
maintain, have no intrinsic value and only function to provide access to partners’ (at least 
partially nonrivalrous) capital that reduces the fixed cost of a high-return technology. 
Social networks form endogenously based on mutual consent and result from optimal 
strategic interaction among all households in an economy. We simplify the setting by 
assuming perfect information and no financial markets.   
In this setting, analogous to other poverty traps models, some initially poor 
households will be caught in a low-level equilibrium because they lack access, through 
either endowments, market or social mechanisms, to the productive assets needed in order 
for the most productive technology available to be the households’ optimal choice, albeit 
perhaps after a period of initial investment. Initially poor households without such access 
must resort to autarkic savings if they are to finance adoption of the improved technology. 
Some find such investment attractive and thereby climb out of poverty of their own 
accord. Others find the necessary sacrifice excessive and optimally choose to remain 
relatively unproductive and thus poor. A third subpopulation might find bootstrapping 
themselves out of poverty unattractive, but will make the necessary investment if they 
receive some help from others, i.e., social network capital becomes necessary for an 
escape from persistent poverty. A fourth subpopulation is able and willing to make the 
necessary investment autarkically, but will find it more attractive to invest in social 
relations that offer a lower cost pathway to higher productivity. The initially poor are thus 
quite a heterogeneous lot, some enjoying independent growth prospects, others with 
socially-mediated growth prospects, with social relations either complementing or 
substituting for own capital in economic mobility, while still others have no real growth 
prospects at all.  
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The tricky part of the analysis stems from the fact that (i) social networks represent 
complex sets of dynamic relationships established non-cooperatively between mutually 
consenting agents, and (ii) a given link’s net value to any agent depends on the set of 
other links operational at the same time. Because the social network structure thus evolves 
endogenously and depends fundamentally on the wealth distribution of the underlying 
economy, the partitioning of the initially poor among the four subpopulations just 
identified will vary in both cross-section and time series. This complex interdependency 
in a setting with multiple and heterogeneous households poses an analytical challenge.  
We advance one reasonable technique for addressing this challenge in numerical 
simulation. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In section 2, we briefly 
summarize the relevant economics literatures on social networks in low-income 
economies and social network formation and relate them to the concept of social network 
capital used in this paper. In section 3, we develop a dynamic optimization model with 
endogenous network formation among heterogeneous households, describe the simple 
non-convex production technology set we use and explain household’s unilateral decision 
concepts. Section 4 studies the optimal social network structure. We illustrate a stylized 
noncooperative game of network formation and introduce the concept of pairwise 
stability, which we use to characterize the stable social network in our context. In section 
5, we then describe household’s equilibria for any stable network that may arise in this 
stylized economy and the resulting patterns of economic mobility. Specifically, we first 
distinguish between static and dynamic asset poverty thresholds as a function of asset and 
social network capital. We then describe heterogeneous patterns of economic mobility, 
how social networks can mediate household-level welfare dynamics and how 
exclusionary mechanisms can arise in equilibrium, effectively barring some of the poor 
from reaching the high-level equilibrium, thereby yielding a poverty trap consistent with 
the existence of social networks. We illustrate these results in section 6, first developing 
an implementable network formation protocol to generate a unique pairwise stable 
network, then simulating randomly generated economies to demonstrate different mobility 
patterns of households in any economy and of households with identical initial 
endowments in different economies. The simulations also allow us to show, in section 7, 
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how endogenous social network formation can overturn familiar policy implications 
generated by models without endogenous social interactions, as when public transfers to 
the poor no longer crowd-out private transfers but can, instead, crowd them in by inducing 
the creation of new social links. Section 8 concludes.  
 
2. Social network capital 
Despite its elusive definitions and applications, a rapidly growing literature on 
“social capital” emphasizes its potential to obviate market failures in low-income 
communities. Durlauf and Fafchamps (2004) distinguish between two broad concepts of 
social capital identifiable in the literature. First, social capital is sometimes referred to as a 
stock of trust and associated attachment(s) to a group or to society at large that facilitate 
coordinated action and the provision of public goods (Coleman 1988, Putnam et al.1993). 
A second conceptualization treats social capital as an individual asset conferring private 
benefits (Onchan 1992, Berry 1993, Townsend 1994, Foster and Rosenzweig 1995, 
Fafchamps 1996, Ghosh and Ray 1996, Kranton 1996, Barr 2000, Bastelaer 2000, Carter 
and Maluccio 2002, Conley and Udry 2002, Fafchamps and Minten 2002, Isham 2002, 
Fafchamps 2004, Bandiera and Rasul 2006, Moser and Barrett 2006). We employ the 
second conceptualization, which is sometimes referred to as “social network capital” so as 
to emphasize that households gain from linking with others to form social networks for 
mutual benefit (Granovetter 1995a, Fafchamps and Minten 2002).  
The literature discusses many prospective mechanisms through which social 
network capital might operate: improved information flow for technology adoption, 
market intelligence or contract monitoring and enforcement, access to loans or insurance, 
or provision of friendship or other intrinsically valued services.  For simplicity’s sake, 
however, we assume the sole function of a social network is to provide access to link 
partners’ (at least partially nonrivalrous) productive assets. Intuitively, this can be 
understood as sharing or borrowing tools, equipment or even animal or human labor, 
obtaining nonrivalrous capital-specific information, etc.5 The social network thus has 
                                                 
 
5 For example, a farmer’s social link to another farmer might afford free access to the latter’s tractor or at 
least to information that reduces tractor acquisition or operating costs if the former opts to buy a tractor 
himself.  Note that such access does not need to be equivalent to that of the asset owner, it merely needs to 
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purely instrumental value in allowing one to accumulate social network capital – socially-
mediated access to others’ productive assets. Social network capital is thus (imperfectly) 
substitutable for traditional, privately possessed capital.  
 The prospective benefits of social network capital thus create material incentives to 
establish social relations with others, even when it is costly to establish and maintain such 
relationships. The formation of a network of bilateral relationships is thus a form of 
investment, akin to more conventional investment in traditional financial, natural or 
physical capital.  
 Social networks necessarily evolve endogenously. A small but growing literature 
demonstrates this empirically in the case of poor agrarian communities (Conley and Udry 
2001, DeWeerdt 2004, Santos and Barrett 2005, Fafchamps and Minten 2001, Fafchamps 
and Gubert forthcoming). Because social networks are (at least partly) the consequences 
of individual’s cost-benefit calculus with respect to prospective links with others, and 
those costs and benefits depend on social distance and the underlying structure of the 
economy, network structure is highly variable.  
Theorists have developed insightful strategic models of endogenous network 
formation, building on seminal work by Aumann and Myerson (1988) and Myerson 
(1991) to model network formation in a cooperative game settings, and on Jackson and 
Wolinsky (1996) to concretize the notion of a stable network based on pairwise stability 
in links and “strong stability” among larger coalitions of agents. Recent advances in the 
literature, nicely reviewed by Jackson (2005), emphasize dynamic perspectives on 
network formation (Watt 2001, Jackson and Watt 2002a, Dutta et al. 2002, Watt 2002) 
and refinement of stability concepts (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997, Jackson and van den 
Nouweland 2000, Konishi and Ünver 2003), but have focused to date almost entirely on 
applications in industrial organization and labor economics. The application of formal 
models of network formation in development economics remains relatively rare.6  
This is an unfortunate lacuna, especially because the literature strongly suggests that 
not everyone benefits from social networks and that there exist patterns to these gaps 
                                                                                                                                                  
 
be superior to that of others who do not have similar social access so that socially-mediated capital access 
reduces fixed costs of operating the high-return technology.  We develop this further in section 3.1. 
6 Calvό-Armengol and Jackson (2004), Conley and Udry (2005), Genicot and Ray (2005),Mogues and 
Carter (2005) and Bloch et. al (2006) are important exceptions. 
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(Durlauf and Fafchamps 2004). For example, Figueroa et al. (1996) point out that social 
exclusion has become a very active subject of debate concerning poverty in Europe. 
Carter and May (2001) and Adato et al. (2006) show that the voluntary and involuntary 
exclusion of poorer black households from the social networks of wealthier whites in 
South Africa has prolonged the legacy of apartheid and minimized the prospective 
benefits to the poor of social capital in obviating barriers to entry into remunerative 
livelihoods. Santos and Barrett (2006) find that asset transfers through social networks in 
southern Ethiopia systematically exclude poorer households, corroborating insights from 
anthropologists and historians studying similar systems across rural Africa.   
Nonrandom patterns of unformed latent social links within a society reflect choices 
made by individuals to forego prospective relationships. We refer to the situation where 
an individual opts not to seek out partners as “social isolation”, reflecting voluntary self-
selection out of prospective networks.7 In other cases, individuals desire links with others 
but are rebuffed by prospective partners, resulting in involuntary “social exclusion”.8  We 
demonstrate below how patterns of social exclusion and isolation may turn fundamentally 
on the initial wealth distribution in an economy, with significant consequences for the 
growth prospects for the poor.9 In this way, models of endogenous social network capital 
as an input into productivity growth provide a natural link between the social networks 
literature and that relating income distribution to economic growth.10 Having situated this 
paper in the broader literature and laid out the core intuition and concepts, we now explain 
our stylized model in detail. 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
7 Postlewaite and Silverman (2005), Kaztman (2001), Barry (1998), Wilson (1987), among others, similarly 
use the concept and term “social isolation” to reflect voluntary non-participation in a society’s institutions.   
8 Note that we use the term “social exclusion” very precisely, especially as compared to the literature on 
social exclusion as, more generally, “inability of a person to participate in basic day-to-day economic and 
social activities of life” (Chakravarty and D’Ambrosio 2006, p.397), as the term is used by, among others, 
Room (1995), Atkinson  (1998), Atkinson et al. (2002), and Bossert et al. (forthcoming).  
9 We only directly refer to social isolation and social exclusion with respect to those agents who remain poor 
over time and do not establish social networks.  Extension to those non-poor who similarly do not link with 
others is straightforward, but omitted in the interest of focus on the paper’s core poverty traps theme. 
10 See, for example, Galor and Zeira (1993) or Mookherjee and Ray (2000), as well as the excellent review 
by Aghion et al. (1999). 
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3. A dynamic optimization model with endogenous network formation 
 Assume n households exist in an economy, ( )nN ,...,2,1= . Each lives for two 
periods,11  Each household i is initially endowed with two types of assets: 
traditional productive capital, denoted A
.1,0=t
i0, representing a one-dimensional aggregate 
index measure of physical, natural, human and financial capital, and social network 
capital, denoted S i0, referring to the traditional capital that might be acquirable from 
others in the endowed (e.g., parents’) social network. There is thus just one type of 
individually owned asset, but people can have access to it directly through private 
ownership or indirectly through their social network. The economy’s initial endowment 
distribution is denoted by ( 00 , SA )φ . Households’ preferences are identical, with utility 
derived solely from consumption, as is the set of available production technologies to 
generate income from one’s capital stock. 
  
3.1 Production technology set 
The available production technology set in this economy consists of two technique-
specific production functions that generate low and high income at any period t,  and 
, respectively, through 
L
tY
H
tY
( )tLLt AfY =                 (1) 
( ))( ttHHt SFAfY −=   with  ( ) 0≥tSF , ( ) 01 <′<− tSF  and ( ) 0=∞F .         (2) 
Technology L is a low-cost, low-return technique that everyone can afford. 
Technology H is a high-return technology with a fixed cost entry barrier, . 
Greater capital is thus required to make technology H attractive because one has to cover 
the fixed cost of operation (i.e., this is not a one-time sunk cost of adoption). Social 
network capital reduces the fixed cost of using the high-return technology and is thus an 
imperfect substitute for owned capital.  
( ) 0≥tSF
                                                 
 
11 Population growth is assumed zero for both periods. 
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Each production technology fulfills standard curvature conditions. For net 
productive assets, ( ) 0≥−≡ ttHt SFANA  and , (almost everywhere) twice-
differentiable functions 
0≥≡ tLt ANA
( )HtH NAf  and ( )LtL NAf  follow 
( ) ( ) 000 == LH ff           (3) 
( ) ( ) ∞=∂
∂=∂
∂
L
t
L
H
t
H
NA
f
NA
f 00
     and   
( ) ( )
0=∂
∞∂=∂
∞∂
L
t
L
H
t
H
NA
f
NA
f
 (4) 
 
( )
0
)( 2
2
≤∂
∂
H
t
H
tH
NA
NAf
   and  
( )
0
)( 2
2
≤∂
∂
L
t
L
tL
NA
NAf
 (5)
 
( ) ( )
0|| ≥∂
∂≥∂
∂
== jNAL
t
L
tL
jNAH
t
H
tH
tt NA
NAf
NA
NAf
 j∀ . (6) 
In each period t, therefore, a household i’s aggregate production function can be 
described as 
MaxYit = [ ] = [LitHit YY , Max ( ))( ititH SFAf − , ( )itL Af  ]                      (7) 
which yields a non-convex production set, with locally increasing returns in the 
neighborhood of ( )itSA , the asset threshold beyond which a household will optimally 
switch to the high-return production technology. ( )itSA  thus satisfies 
Hf [ ( ) )( itit SFSA − ]  = [Lf ( )itSA ].                                                 (8) 
Figure 1 presents this aggregate production function as an outer envelope of the two 
specific production functions, with the threshold asset stock ( )itSA .12  
Social network capital thereby reduces the private asset stock necessary to make 
technology H optimal. As Sit increases, the high-return production function shifts in, 
lowering the minimum asset threshold needed to make high-return production optimal, 
i.e., ( ) 0<′ itSA , which follows implicitly from (8) and the assumption that F(·) is 
decreasing in Sit. This effect is depicted in Figure 2.  
                                                 
 
12 This is in the spirit of Cooper (1987), Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) or Azariadis and Drazen 
(1990), each of whom exploits similar technologies to analyze multiple equilibria. Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990) discuss how this type of non-convexity can arise as firms internally coordinate many complementary 
activities. Durlauf (1993) explores the role of complementarities and incomplete markets in economic 
growth under non-convexities of this type and shows that localized technological complementarities, when 
strong enough, produce long-run multiple equilibria. 
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An obvious implication is that the value of social network capital will vary across 
households. For households with sufficient privately-held assets, ( )ktkt SAA ≥ , adoption of 
H is optimal regardless of their stock of social network capital, but Sit  nonetheless reduces 
the fixed costs they incur, thereby increasing the productivity of their asset stock. Their 
investment incentives are thus driven by the relative costs of investment in social network 
capital and traditional, privately held assets.  
Social network capital is potentially most valuable for those households k who 
possess insufficient assets themselves to adopt H, ( )ktkt SAA < , but who are “not too far” 
in some sense from ( )ktSA  so that investment in building social network capital can lower 
the critical threshold they face to the point that the high-return technology becomes 
optimal in the future. Because social network capital has no value for those who do not 
employ technology H, however, as one’s distance from ( )ktSA  increases the prospective 
benefit from increased future social network capital eventually falls once it will not 
suffice to bring the threshold down far enough, given the household’s current and 
prospective asset stock. For such households, there is no incentive to invest in social 
network capital, thus they will rationally self-select out of costly social relations, thereby 
becoming socially isolated. 
 
3.2 Household utility maximization 
 A household i derives utility solely from consumption each period, maximizing 
  ( ) ( 10 iii CuCuU )ρ+=                     (9) 
where ρ  is the discount factor. We further assume there are no financial markets, thus 
autarkic saving is the only investment strategy. A subsistence consumption constraint 
applies such that  
−∞=)( itCu   for any  and 0≤irC .tr ≤                       (10) 
This puts a minimal limit on the intertemporal consumption tradeoff available to the 
household by permanently penalizing non-positive consumption in any period.13
                                                 
 
13 This condition is redundant for some classes of utility function. We, however, include it here to generalize 
the context of the model. It will also be useful for part 5 as we will consider the special case of linear utility. 
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In period 0, a household i with endowments ( )00 , ii SA  optimally chooses a 
production technology and allocates the resulting income from production among 
consumption ( ), investment in productive assets ( ) and investment in its social 
network ( ), which is the product of its network
0iC 0iI
ii KX 0′ ( )0iX  – the binary (0,1) column 
vector reflecting the combination of social relationships it establishes during period 0 – 
and the column vector of costs the household has to incur to establish or maintain these 
relationships (Ki).14  
Note that the household incurs costs in period 0 for establishing network Xi0, but it 
derives no immediate benefits. The laws of motion mapping initial endowments into 
stocks at the beginning of period 1 depreciate  and  at rates 0iA 0iS Aδ  and Sδ , 
respectively, while period 0 investments add to the stock of both assets. The new stock of 
social network capital is a function of the household’s social network at the end of period 
0 and the benefit function (Bi) that maps proportion of assets held by members of its 
established network into social network capital, as described in section 4. In period 1, the 
household again chooses the optimal production technology and consumes all the 
resulting income.15
A key distinction between A and S is that the household unilaterally decides the 
stock of traditional capital it will own, but it does not unilaterally decide on its social 
network because each social link involves bilateral decisions by both prospective partners. 
The household’s social network is therefore the product of optimal social interactions, 
taking into consideration everyone in the economy’s network preferences. A household’s 
utility maximizing network might therefore prove infeasible because its preferred link 
partners do not have reciprocal desires for an active link. In modeling the household’s 
unilateral decision, we thus define  as a household i’s desired network, representing 
the social network it would choose unilaterally, were that feasible. Note that this is not an 
equilibrium network.  
d
iX 0
                                                 
 
14 Both Ki and Xi0 are described in more detail in section 4. 
15 Zero investment in the terminal period is obviously an artifact of our simplifying assumption of a known, 
finite lifetime with no subsequent generations. 
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( ) ( ) ( ){ }Max diidiidii XCXIXC 010000 ,,
For every possible desired network, , a household can derive its corresponding 
optimal investment, 
d
iX 0
( )dii XI 0*0 . Specifically, the indirect utility that household i with 
endowments (  derives from a possible desired network  is  )00 , ii SA diX 0
         ( )dii XV      =                                   0* ( ) ( )10 ii CuCu ρ+          (11) 
         subject to:  ( ) idiiiii KXISAYC 00000 , −−≤  
    ( ) 001 1 iiAi IAA +−= δ  
    ( ) idiiSi BXSS 001 1 +−= δ  
    ( )111 , iii SAYC ≤  
     0, 11 ≥ii AS
.0, 10 >ii CC  
The production function follows (7) and the subsistence constraint is incorporated into the 
final non-negativity constraint. Unilaterally, each rational household in this economy can 
perform intertemporal cost-benefit calculus for any of their possible networks. This 
structure provides a framework for the household’s network formation strategy and 
creates a natural link between real capital and social network capital investment decisions. 
We now detail the specifications for the endogenous network formation and the suitable 
equilibrium concept in order to resolve this dynamic optimization problem. 
 
4. Optimal social network structure 
 Because the formation of links is a strategic decision affecting households’ optimal 
consumption and investment decisions, we model network formation as a non-cooperative 
game in which link formation is based on a binary process of mutual consent between 
individuals who costlessly observe the current wealth distribution. Due to the multiplicity 
of Nash equilibria, many of which make little sense from a social network perspective, we 
reduce the range of feasible equilibria through imposing two restrictions. The first follows 
from the fact, well-established in sociology, that active social networks are primarily 
formed among individuals already acquainted with one another. This implies a central role 
for social distance in determining the net benefits of active link formation. We let social 
distance affect the individual-specific costs and benefits of link formation in a way that 
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helps limit the range of prospective links to a domain over which they are most likely.  
Second, we apply the notion of pairwise stability to characterize social networks 
consistent with a stable Nash equilibrium in this economy. The ensuing subsections 
develop these points and the noncooperative network formation game in detail. 
 
4.1 Social distance, feasible interactions and link-specific cost-benefit analysis 
 A broad literature suggests there exist boundaries to prospective social interactions. 
Santos and Barrett (2005, 2006), among others, find that not everyone knows everyone 
else, even in small, ethnically homogeneous rural settings in which households pursue the 
same livelihood, and that knowing someone is effectively a precondition to establishing 
an active link. Consistent with this, many models of network formation emphasize local 
interactions within prescribed neighborhoods (Ellison 1993, Ellison and Fudenberg 1993, 
Fagiolo 2001).  
 In our setting, each household is characterized by its universally observable  
endowment. Thus each household can identify its social distance from every other 
household in  space. As in Akerlof (1997) or Mogues and Carter (2005), we use the 
geometric distance between households’ endowments to reflect social distance,  
( )00 , SA
( SA, )
( ) ( ) ( )200200, jiji SSAAjid −+−= α 0≥; α ,          (12) 
for any pair of households, i and j, where α  establishes the relative weight of pre-existing 
social network capital in determining social distance. Conceptually, social distance 
measures relative proximity between two households, which reflects the degree of 
discomfort in their social interaction. Potentially, it can thus serve as a proxy for the cost 
of establishing and maintaining a social relationship. 
Formally, a household i incurs total costs of ii KX 0′  to establish its network of 
links , where K0iX i is a column vector of costs they have to incur to establish each active 
link. Specifically, we assume that the economic cost to household i to establish a link with 
household  j is 
( ) ( )( ) ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛⋅=
0
0
1 ,
i
j
i A
A
jidjK θ  with  for 0, 11 >′θθ djid ≤),( ,  otherwise.   (13) ∞=′1θ
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The idea is that it is easier to establish a link with people who are socially proximate, and 
intuitively the poorer partner may incur more costs. We assume no economies of scale or 
scope in building networks.  
 The constant d  reflects a social distance threshold beyond which social interaction 
is not feasible. In our context, we assume that d  is economy-specific but universal to 
each household in the economy.16 It implicitly reflects physical and social barriers on the 
probability that individuals meet and interact. A low d  can represent an economy in 
which households cluster into many small groups of shared characteristics with low inter-
group connectivity or an economy characterized by significant ethnic, racial or religious 
discrimination or physical isolation. A high d , on the other hand, allows for greater social 
interactions.  
 The benefits to household i from the active links in its social network are reflected in 
the column vector Bi, mapping some proportion of its partners’ (at least partially 
nonrivalrous) asset endowments into augmentation to its social network capital next 
period. Specifically, the gross benefit to household i from a link with household j follows 
 ( ) 00302 jiji AAAjB −−= θθ   with 1,0 32 << θθ .                       (14) 
 Implicitly, 10 2 << θ  emphasizes the nature of access to link partners’ (at least 
partially nonrivalrous) capital.17 This generalization is highly stylized but very intuitive. 
Some components of the composite asset are nonrivalrous (e.g., equipment-specific 
knowledge). Others, such as tools and equipment, can be shared and thus used at different 
time without affecting (at some degree) the owner’s (or other borrowers’) use, but perhaps 
with degraded performance for the borrowing (e.g., due to imperfect timing). Whether one 
considers this unfettered, occasional or probabilistic access, the key is that i’s access to 
socially-mediated capital is increasing in the stock of links’ privately-held assets. 
 As with the costs of links, we assume that social network capital benefits are link-
specific and independent of all others links the household establishes. The social network 
                                                 
 
16 This assumption is reasonable give households’ identical preferences. The sensible extension of this 
context is to allow d  to vary with other socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., initial endowments, groups). 
17 Note that in this simple model, benefits are only generated from direct links. There are no benefits from 
being connected to other households indirectly through one’s direct links. 
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capital gained from a link is not symmetric to both members of the dyad for the simple 
reason that a poorer household can call on more resources from their richer partner than 
vice versa. Extreme differences in wealth, however, may hinder mutual benefits, as 
reflected in the second term in (14). The asymmetric specification fits the empirical 
pattern that great wealth disparities reduce the likelihood of link formation between 
households.18
 Two fundamental points distinguish our network formation model from others. First, 
costs and benefits of links are realized intertemporally.19 A household’s preference over 
possible networks, therefore, relies on its realized net intertemporal utility gains. Second, 
household i’s decision to link with household j is interdependent with its decision to link 
with others. A link with one household might complement or substitute for links with 
others. The multiple equilibria in our setting accentuate this interdependency because only 
those households that can accumulate enough resources to make the high-return 
production technology optimal will benefit from social network capital. Therefore, many 
households’ valuation of a given link is conditional on their success in establishing other 
links as well. To take into account these spillover possibilities, households’ network 
strategies involve choosing among possible networks of links, instead of just myopically 
considering each link separately.  
 Let the indirect utility  represent the net intertemporal benefit to household i 
from a network . To apply the established network decision framework in the proper 
noncooperative game setting, we now need to introduce the network structures and 
terminology.
( ii XV * )
                                                
iX
20
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 Of course, our cost-benefit specifications are highly stylized and thus somewhat arbitrary. Reasonable 
deviation from these specifics nonetheless retains the main ideas and results reported in section 5-7.   
19 In existing network formation models, relationship payoffs occur within the period (Jackson and 
Wolinsky 1996, Johnson and Gilles 2000, Calvo-Armensol and Jackson 2001, Goyal and Joshi 2002).  
20 We apply the widely accepted network notation, established by Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) and Jackson 
(2004). 
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4.2 Social network structure 
 Social links can be established within the feasible interaction space determined by 
d .21 We use the notation  to describe the binary link between households i and j. The 
network of household i, reflecting the combination of its binary links, is represented by 
the vector: 
ij
                    ( )( )djidijNjijxX i ≤≠∈= ),(,,     where  { }1,0)( ∈ijx .          (15) 
The binary index  is defined by joint agreement to establish a link, , or 
failure to jointly establish such a link, 
( )ijx ( ) 1=ijx
( ) 0=ijx .  
 By way of illustration, consider an economy with { }5,4,3,2,1=N  and the 
endowment distribution ( 00 , SA )φ  illustrated in figure 3. For 9=d , for example, 
household 3’s network can be generally represented by 
( )
( )
( )⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜
⎝
⎛
=
34
32
31
3
x
x
x
X  with ( ) { }1,03 ∈kx  
for all . Clearly interaction between 3 and 5 is not feasible because 
>
4,2,1=k
)5,3(d 9=d  . Hypothetically,  represents household 3’s network that consists 
of only a link with household 1.  arises when 3 establishes links with everyone 
with whom interaction is feasible, while  presents the case where household 3 
has no links. Defining household i’s set of all feasible networks as 
⎟⎟
⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
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21 In the language of the networks literature, d distinguishes between local and global interactions. 
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More generally, for an economy described of { }nN ,...,2,1=  households, the set of 
all feasible links is represented by ( ){ }djidjiNjiijg N ≤≠∈= ,,,, .22 The economy’s 
network g represents any set of links  The set .Ngg ⊂ { }NgggG ⊂=  denotes the set of 
the economy’s all feasible networks. In any economy’s network Gg ∈ , household i’s 
network represents the combination of links in  involving household i. That is 
 with  for all
g
( ) ii XgX = ( ) 1=ijx gij∈ . The corresponding net intertemporal benefit to 
household i in an economy’s network  is thus g ( ))(* gXV ii .   
 
4.3 Noncooperative game of network formation 
 Endogenous social network formation results from costly, mutually consensual links 
formed between pairs of households. It is natural to treat this process as a noncooperative 
game. We therefore use a generalization of Myerson (1991)’s simple model of network 
formation under binary consent in a cooperative game setting.23
 Generally, for a finite set of players represented by households , a 
noncooperative game  can be described as follows. 
{ }nN ,...,2,1=
( Π,A )
 For every household ,  denotes an action set: Ni∈ iA
 ( ) { }{ }1,0)(,)( ∈∈≠= jlgijijjlA iNii  ,           (16) 
where an action ( )( )Nii gijijjla ∈≠= ,  reflects household i’s unilateral decision over 
all the feasible links.  indexes household i’s action with respect to a link ij  and so 
 if i seeks a link with j. Therefore, a link ij  is established if l . The 
set of economy-wide actions is thus described by 
)( jli
1)( =jli 1) =i()( = lj ji
∏∈= Ni iAA . The resulting network 
from any action  is thus given by  Aa∈
 ( ) { }1)()( ==∈= iljlgijag jiN .            (17) 
                                                 
 
22 Notice that is not a set of all subset of N of size 2 as we only consider local interaction based on Ng d . 
23 Generalizations of Myerson (1991) are widely used, by Calvo-Armengol and Ilkilic (2004), Bloch and 
Jackson (2006) and Gilles, Chakrabarti and Sarangi (2006), among others. 
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 For every household , Ni∈ ℜ→Π Ai :  denotes household i’s payoff function 
assigning to every action , a net payoff Aa∈ )(aiΠ , deduced from participation in a 
network . Specifically, ( )ag ( ) ( )))((* agXVa iii =Π . And the composite payoff function is 
represented by .  ( ) Nn A ℜ→ΠΠ=Π :,...,1
 For every action ( )( ) Agijijjla Nii ∈∈≠= ,  and Ni∈ , we denote actions 
selected by the households other than i as  ii Aa −− ∈  where ∏≠− = ji ji AA . A network 
( ) Ngag ⊂*  is supported by a Nash equilibrium with an action  in our game 
 if for every household , 
Aa ∈*
( Π,A ) Ni∈ ( ) ( )**** , iiii aaa −Π≥Π   for every action . ii Aa ∈**
 Because mutual consent is required to form a link but each individual partner can 
unilaterally delete a link in order to increase its payoff, this game will have many Nash 
equilibria. As but one obvious example, the empty network is supported as a Nash 
equilibrium in this game. This is especially unnatural in our context where links result in 
some net positive intertemporal payoff. We therefore need to refine the equilibrium 
concept in order to deal with this essential characteristic of mutually consensual link 
formation.24 We choose to apply the pairwise stability concept. 
 
4.4 Pairwise stability 
 The concept of pairwise stability25 is due to Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). In our 
setting a network is pairwise stable if (i) no household would be better off if it severed one 
of its links, and (ii) no pair of households would both benefit (with at least one seeing a 
strict benefit) from adding a link that is not in the network.  
                                                 
 
24 It is well-recognized in the networks literature that the mutual consent requirement for link formation 
poses a hurdle to the use of any off-the-shelf game theoretic technique. Jackson (2005) thus suggests that 
either some sort of coalitional equilibrium concept or an extensive form game with a protocol for proposing 
and accepting links in some sequence is required. The game is necessarily ad hoc, and fine details of the 
protocol (e.g., the ordering of who proposes links when, whether or not the game has a finite horizon, 
players’ patience, etc.) generally matter.    
25 This stability concept is criticized as insufficient for a network to be stable over time (Jackson 2005). 
Because it only considers deviations on a single link at a time, it might be possible that some group of 
players could be made better off by some complicated reorganizing of their links. Of course, one can use 
other refinements, such as the notion of strong stability (Dutta and Mutuswami 1997), which allows for 
deviation of larger coalitions. It may, however, not be necessary in this simple model, since we study only 
one round of network formation and do not aim to study the network structure per se. 
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 Formally, a network  is pairwise stable with respect to payoff structure NGg ∈' Π  if 
(i)  for all ' , gij ∈ ( ) ( )ijgg ii −Π≥Π ''  and ( ) ( )ijgg jj −Π≥Π ''  and  
(ii)  for all ' , if gij ∉ ( ) ( )'' gijg ii Π>+Π  then ( ) ( )'' gijg jj Π<+Π                    (18) 
where  represents the network that results from adding the link to the network  
and similarly,  denotes the network obtained by removing the link  from 
network .  
ijg +' ij g
ijg −' ij
g
  The pairwise stable network that arises from our noncooperative game will thus 
depict every household i’s optimal network 
*g
( )** gX i  in this economy.26 In the next section, 
we analyze household’s equilibria and patterns of economic mobility for any pairwise 
stable network that may arise in this economy. And in section 6, more interestingly, we 
develop a specific protocol for the proposed noncooperative game that allows us to 
simulate a unique pairwise stable network for any economy. We then use such simulations 
to demonstrate our main results and the public policy implications.  
  
5. Households’ equilibria and patterns of economic mobility 
 Due to the mutual consent requirement for link formation, household i’s optimal 
network, resulting from the economy’s pairwise stable network structure, constrains the 
optima for each household in the economy. The equilibrium of this model is, therefore, 
characterized by every household’s accumulation decisions { } niii IX ,...,1*0*0 , = , which 
determine current and future technology choice, consumption levels, and thus each 
household’s level of well-being. 
 The preceding model specifications and equilibrium concepts prepare us now to 
study how social network capital influences households’ economic mobility through their 
optimal network formation and capital accumulation decisions. We proceed by assigning 
specific functional forms to the general mappings outlined in section 3.  
 Specifically, in an economy of { }niN ,...,2,1==  households, we consider the case 
where each household i, initially endowed with ( )00 , ii SA , faces the unilateral 
                                                 
 
26 The time index is dropped here. In the next section, however, the optimal network is denoted as . 0=t *0iX
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intertemporal utility maximization problem (11). We consider the extreme case where 
utility is linear in consumption, thereby maximizing a household’s willingness to bear 
short-term reduction in current consumption in order to take advantage of a high rate of 
return on investment in owned assets or social network capital: 
 ( ) 1010 , iiiii aCaCCCU ρ+=   , with  and  0>a 10 << ρ .          (19) 
The household faces the non-convex production technology set satisfying conditions (1)-
(6) in each period :              1,0=t
( ) MaxSAY itit =, [ ( ) ( ) 21 321 , αα itSitit FkAkAk −− ]    where          (20) 
1,0 21 << αα , 12 αα > , ,  and            0, 21 >kk 13 >k .0>F
It is well-known that in this setting, with a non-convex technology set and constrained 
autarkic savings, there may exist multiple equilibria, one of which is the poverty trap 
associated with the choice of the low-return technology. We begin, in the next sub-
section, by analyzing the benchmark case without social networks, in which the 
household’s optimal welfare depends solely on its autarkic savings and accumulation 
capacity. We then expand the analysis to consider the case in which the households can 
form a social network and explore its effects on economic mobility, especially among 
those who might otherwise be trapped in poverty. 
 
5.1 The benchmark case without a social network  
 The case where , implying no functioning social network, replicates a 
traditional poverty traps model. The non-convex production set in (20) implies an asset 
threshold 
0=itS t∀
A  such that, at any period t, those with AAt ≥  can optimally undertake high-
return production.27 For simplicity’s sake, assume those who choose the low return 
technology (the first argument on the right-hand side of (20)) generate income that leaves 
them poor while those who choose the high-return technology (the second argument on 
the right-hand side of (20)) earn income that renders them non-poor.  Thus threshold A  
represents a static asset poverty line, which distinguishes current poor from non-poor. In 
                                                 
 
27 A  satisfies a condition analogous to that in (8). 
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any period t, the poor in our context are, therefore, those households with AAt < , i.e. 
those currently undertaking low-return production. 
 Household i’s first-order conditions for an interior optimum thus potentially yield 
two equilibria: the low-level equilibrium (poverty trap) ( )0,0 00* == iiiL XSU  and the 
high-level equilibrium ( )0,0 00* == iiiH XSU  such that 
( ) =+=== *1*000* 0,0 LiLiiiiL aCaCXSU ρ      (21) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−+ −− 111 11111
1
1100 1 α
α
α ραρραδ kkakAAYa iAi          and  
( ) =+=== *1*000* 0,0 HiHiiiiH aCaCXSU ρ               
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−+ −− 222 12221
1
2200 1 α
α
α ραρραδ kkaFkAAYa iAi . 
 We ensure the existence of these two equilibria by making two rather innocuous 
assumptions, which constrain our parameterization. First, for any household i, a high-level 
equilibrium of well-being is always preferred to a lower one:  
 ( ) ( )0,00,0 00*00* ==>== iiiLiiiH XSUXSU        ⇔               (22) 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .0111222 1 11111111 1221222 >⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛−⎥⎦
⎤⎢⎣
⎡ −−⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−−− αααααα ραραρραραρ kkkFkkk  
Not every household, however, can achieve .  This depends on a household’s feasible 
autarkic savings. Formally, household i reaches a high-level equilibrium if and only if 
*
iHU
( 00,0 00*0 ≥== iiHi XSC ) , i.e., if they can afford the autarkic savings corresponding to the 
high-level equilibrium. For others who cannot afford this costly savings, we then make 
the second assumption that accumulation toward  is at least feasible, thus           *iLU
     ( ) 00,0 00*0 >== iiLi XSC   ⇔  ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 11 11100 >−−+ −αραδ kAAY iAi .            (23) 
 Now consider the benchmark setting where it is possible for some initially poor 
household to escape poverty. Formally, the initially poor households graduate to the high-
level equilibrium, and thereby escape poverty, through autarkic savings if and only if 
  ( ) 00,0 00*0 >== iiHi XSC  ⇔  ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 21 1 122001 >−−−+ − FkAAk iAi αα ραδ .      (24) 
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 Typical for any poverty trap model, (24) suggests the existence of a dynamic asset 
threshold  at which optimal household savings (i.e., asset accumulation) bifurcates. 
Those initially poor households with 
*
0A
*
00 AAA i ≥> 28 will save and escape poverty in the 
future (albeit not in the initial period), while other poor with  are trapped in long-
term poverty. This dynamic asset threshold is analogous to the dynamic asset poverty line 
proposed by Carter and Barrett (2006). In the absence of social network capital, a 
household’s initial endowment of productive assets, , determines its long-term 
equilibrium well-being. Note also that by this construction initially non-poor households 
(whose
*
00 AAi <
0iA
*
00 AAAi >≥ ) are always able to achieve the high-return equilibrium.29
 
5.2 The possibilities presented by social networks and their limitations 
 Let us now reintroduce the possibility of social network capital that reduces the 
fixed cost associated with using the high-return production technique. This generalizes the 
static asset poverty line ( )tSA  such that any household with ( )00 ii SAA ≥  optimally 
undertakes high-return production in period 0, while those with ( )00 ii SAA <  optimally 
choose the low-return technique in the first period. ( )0iSA  thus solves 
 ( ) 1][ 01 αiSAk  =  ( ) 20 ][ 302 αiSi FkSAk −−               (25) 
with ( ) 0' 0 <iSA , so that greater social network capital lowers the static asset poverty line, 
as previously discussed in section 3.1. In this way, one’s inherited social network capital 
can make high-return production technologies, and thus a higher equilibrium standard of 
living, immediately attainable when one’s private stock of capital would not otherwise 
                                                 
 
28 Given our assumptions, it is necessarily true that AA ≤*0 . By way of proof, suppose instead that AA >*0  
and consider an individual endowed with *00 AAA i << . As 0iAA < , , and so the 
household can initially adopt high-return production technology. Thus, 
( ) 21 0201 )( αα FAkAk ii −<
( ) ( ) 2020 αFAkAY i −= . But as , *00 AAi <
( 00,0 00*0 <== iiHi XSC )  implies ( ) ( ) ( ) 01 22 1 122002 <−−−+− − FkAFAk iAi αα ραδ . This, however, contradicts (24). 
29 This condition rules out the possibility of downward mobility of the initially non-poor, which is 
reasonable given there is no uncertainty in the model.  
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suffice.  Further, those endowed with adequate social network capital might not need to 
invest in building further social links so as to accumulate social network capital. 
 The existence of multiple equilibria is confirmed by our previous assumptions in 
(22) and (23). For any optimal social network  that household i establishes, the two 
possible equilibria are 
0iX
( ) =+= *1*00* LiLiiiL aCaCXU ρ      (26) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −′−−+ −− 111 11111
1
110000 1, α
α
α ραρραδ kkakKXASAYa iiiAii        and 
( ) =+= *1*00* HiHiiiH aCaCXU ρ                
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) .1, 22002 1222131 1220000 ⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −−′−−+ −′+−−− ααδα ραρραδ kkaFkkKXASAYa iiis BXSiiiAii
Analogous to the benchmark case, any household i with an optimal social network  
can achieve the high-level equilibrium 
0iX
( )0* iiH XU  if and only if ( ) 00*0 ≥iHi XC . 
 Perhaps more interestingly, and less obviously, household i’s ability to establish a 
network  may affect the dynamic asset poverty line. Consider an initially poor 
household (whose
0iX
( )00 ii SAA < ). It can gradually accumulate resources toward the high-
level equilibrium, and thus escape future (but not current) poverty, if it establishes a 
productive network  such that0iX
30   
( ) 00*0 >iHi XC ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01 0131 122001 0021 >′−−−−+ ′+−−− iiBXSiAi KXFkkAAk iisδαα ραδ .(27)  
 Therefore, according to (27), there exist three distinct avenues by which the initially 
poor can reach the high-level equilibrium. First, a poor household can undertake autarkic 
savings, just as in the previous section without social network capital.  Note that unlike in 
the preceding case, a greater endowment of social network capital ( ) reduces the 
savings required to reach 
0iS
( )0iSA  and thus to reach the high-level equilibrium in the future. 
Those well-endowed with social network capital are thus better positioned to escape 
                                                 
 
30 If there exists a network 00 ≠iX  such that ( ) 00*0 >iHi XC , then ( ) ( 00*0* => iiLiiH XUXU )  if 
( ) ( 00*00*0 => iHiiHi XCXC )  by (22) and (23). Thus the benefit of reaching the high-level equilibrium induces 
the household to make costly links, if it can afford to do so. Of course,  if ( ) ( ) 00 0*00*0 >>= iHiiHi XCXC , then 
it is optimal for the household to graduate from poverty through autarkic savings. 
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poverty through an autarkic savings strategy.  Second, the initially poor household can 
establish new social links that generate enough future social network capital to drive 
down ( )1iSA to the point that the high-return technology becomes optimal in the next 
period, without necessarily having to accumulate capital itself. Third, the household can 
invest in both social links to lower the asset threshold and private capital to augment its 
initial endowment and let it attain this lowered threshold level. 
 These latter two avenues indicate that the dynamic asset poverty threshold depends 
not only on initial endowments , but also on the poor’s opportunity to establish a 
social network, , that could generate the social network capital necessary for them to 
graduate from poverty. Thus factors that determine the poor’s ability to establish a 
productive social network, such as the broader wealth distribution in the economy and the 
maximum social distance over which links are feasible in a given society, also influence 
the initially poor’s long-term well-being. Unlike standard poverty traps models in which 
one’s initial conditions determine one’s growth prospects, in a setting where social 
interactions can condition investment behavior, the initial conditions of the entire 
economy now matter. 
( 00 , ii SA )
0iX
 Intuitively, (27) suggests that there exists a dynamic asset threshold condition on a 
given endowed network structure, ( )0/ 00*0 =ii XSA , such that for initially poor 
households with ( ) ( )0000*0 0/ iiii SAAXSA <≤= , 
     ( ) 000*0 >=iHi XC    ⇔ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 01 021 131 122001 >−−−+ −−− is SiAi FkkAAk δαα ραδ .   (28) 
Such households gradually escape poverty without needing to establish a new social 
network  to accumulate their (already sufficient) social network capital. For them, 
new social links are attractive if and only if the feasible network  increases welfare by 
reducing the fixed costs of production enough to (at least) offset the costs of establishing 
the links – i.e., if it permits positive net intertemporal welfare gains. Therefore, the 
feasible network  they will consider needs to follow 
0iX
0iX
0iX
 ( ) ( )00*00*0 => iHiHi XCXC      ⇔     ( )[ ] 100 31
3
0 <+′ ′−−− iiiS BXSii kFk
KX
δ .                    (29) 
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For other initially poor households with ( ) ( )000*00 0/ iiii SAXSAA <=< , they cannot 
reach the high-level equilibrium without establishing new social links so as to accumulate 
additional social network capital and thereby make future adoption of the high-return 
technology optimal.  
 Any household that fails to meet condition (28) – either because it has inadequate 
endowments  or because there is no feasible network  that would 
generate sufficient social network capital to let it reach the high-level equilibrium – will 
never consider establishing a social network with others. Because establishing social links 
is costly and the household will never benefit from these, very poor and socially distant 
households optimally self-select out of social networks, choosing instead self-imposed 
social isolation. This follows from 
( 00 , ii SA ) 00 iiX Ω∈
 ( ) ( )0*0* 0 iiLiiL XUXU )>= , 00 ≠∀ iX) .             (30) 
This captures the notion that for many poor people, social networks do not provide a 
viable escape route from long-term poverty, as Mogues and Carter (2005) and Adato et al. 
(2006) argue with reference to post-apartheid South Africa. 
 Among the initially poor households (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ), we can further identify 
initial asset positions for which social network capital complements or substitutes for 
productive assets in facilitating upward economic mobility.  Because those endowed with 
( )00*0 ii SAAA <≤  can escape from poverty even without inheriting or building social 
network capital, investment in  is only optimal if it efficiently substitutes for 
productive asset accumulation – i.e., if establishing links is cheaper than capital 
investment for the household – in advancing economic mobility. For such households, 
social network capital reduces the savings required to graduate to the high-level 
equilibrium and thereby increases lifetime utility. In such cases, social network capital is a 
substitute for traditional capital accumulation in facilitating productivity and welfare 
growth.  
0iX
 For the initially poor households (whose ( )00 ii SAA < ) endowed with , 
however, social network capital is a complement to traditional capital accumulation, in 
that it is needed in order to lower the asset poverty threshold and thereby enable the 
*
00 AAi <
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household to escape from poverty in the future. There are two distinct subpopulations 
among those for whom social network capital is a complement to traditional capital in 
mediating economic mobility. First, those with ( ) *0000*0 0/ AAXSA iii <≤=  are endowed 
with sufficient social network capital that, even with social network capital 
depreciation, Sδ , their extant social network capital suffices to enable traditional capital 
accumulation enough to reach the high-level equilibrium in period 1. Second, households 
with ( ) *000*00 0/ AXSAA iii <=<  need to form new social links – i.e., invest in – to 
augment their initial social network capital endowment in order to complement asset 
accumulation necessary to escape future poverty. Their potential to escape poverty thus 
relies on the capacity and possibility to establish productive social network. 
0iX
  
5.3 Patterns of social network-mediated economic mobility and immobility 
 So far we have treated households’ optimal social networks as if they are 
exogenously given. Now we consider what happens as one inserts households into a 
broader society in which the mutual consent requirement governs social network 
formation, yielding an optimal network structure,  Four distinct patterns of economic 
mobility and immobility emerge among the initially poor (whose
.*0iX
( )00 ii SAA < ) upon 
realization of their optimal network  In the next section we explore, via simulation, 
the process by which these patterns originate. Here we simply characterize these distinct 
subpopulations, building directly on the previous sub-section. 
.*0iX
 
(1) Households  who escape from poverty without forming social networks 
 One subpopulation of the initially poor enjoy sufficient initial endowments, 
( 0/ 00*00 => iii XSAA ), that they can accumulate resources autarkically, pulling 
themselves up to the high-level equilibrium in period 1 by their own bootstraps without 
investing in accumulating further social network capital. Their optimality condition can be 
characterized as 
 0*0 =iX   and  ( )0*0** == iiHi XUU .                           (31) 
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Among this group, some households never consider establishing a new network, as all of 
their possible networks would yield non-positive net intertemporal utility gain, i.e.,  
( ) ( )00*0* =< iiHiiH XUXU v , . Other households may be regrettably autarkic in 
their climb out of poverty, having failed to establish any preferred network,  
such that 
00 iiX Ω∈∀
v
00
ˆ
iiX Ω∈
( ) ( 0ˆ 0*0* => iiHiiH XUXU ) . This latter subgroup’s first-best arrangement proves 
socially infeasible, leaving them worse off than they might have been under a different 
equilibrium social network configuration, but still able to exit poverty in time. 
 
(2) Households who form social networks and thereby escape from poverty 
A second subpopulation of the initially poor successfully establishes networks with 
others, utilizing their accumulated productive social network capital so as to graduate 
from poverty. Their optimality condition can be characterized as 
 0*0 ≠iX   and  ( )*0** iiHi XUU = .                    (32) 
This subpopulation’s experience of a socially-mediated climb out of poverty is the 
phenomenon that excites the imagination of the most ardent fans of social capital as an 
instrument for poverty reduction. Among this group, there are likewise two distinct 
subgroups. Those initially poor households with ( )0/ 00*00 =≥ iii XSAA  find it cheaper to 
use social network in mediating economic mobility, but they can escape the poverty trap 
regardless. Social capital improves their welfare but it does not fundamentally alter the 
qualitative path they follow over time. 
 By contrast, the crucial subpopulation is those with ( )0/ 00*00 =< iii XSAA . Their 
escape from poverty will not be possible if they cannot build a productive social network.  
Their initial endowment of both assets and social network capital is insufficient for them 
to climb out of poverty in time unless they can find other households willing to link with 
them.  This subpopulation is fortunate in that the underlying attribute distribution in the 
economy generated sufficient social proximity that others were willing to link with these 
poor households. 
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(3) Households involuntarily excluded from social networks and trapped in poverty 
Others are not so fortunate. The next subpopulation of the initially poor could escape 
from poverty if they were able to establish one or more of their preferred social networks. 
However, they are rebuffed by those they approach for possible links and in the absence 
of their desired social network capital, they cannot accumulate enough traditional capital 
to climb out of poverty. Involuntary social exclusion thus conspires with meager initial 
asset endowments to trap these households in long-term poverty. A bit more formally, 
although there exists at least one network  such that 00
~
iiX Ω∈ ( ) 0~ 0*0 >iHi XC , no such 
network arises in equilibrium. Thus they resort to 0*0 =iX , although this is not their 
preferred network. Their optimality condition is represented by 
0*0 =iX  , ( )0*0** == iiLi XUU   and  such that 00~ iiX Ω∈∃ ( ) 0~ 0*0 >iHi XC .       (34) 
This constrained optimum best illustrates how social networks can fail the poor because of 
the mutual consent condition that underpins the formation of social links. 
 
(4) Households who choose social isolation and remain trapped in poverty 
The final subpopulation comprises those with especially meager endowments, 
( 0/ 00*00 =< iii XSAA ), who have no possibility to escape poverty no matter the social 
networks they create. None of their feasible networks, 00 iiX Ω∈ , would generate 
sufficient social network capital to complement traditional capital accumulation in 
fostering upward economic mobility. Since links are costly to establish and only yield 
welfare gains if one employs the high-return technology they will never optimally choose, 
this subpopulation does not value social network capital and therefore does not establish 
any links in equilibrium. Their optimality condition can be characterized as  
0*0 =iX  , ( )0*0** == iiLi XUU  and ( ) 00*0 <iHi XC s   for all 00 iiX Ω∈s .          (33) 
Since 0*0 =iX  is their top-ranked network choice in , they self-select out of social 
networks, rejecting any proposals made to them by others in the economy. The result is 
socially isolated, long-term poverty. 
Ranked
i0Ω
 These distinct mobility and immobility patterns are a product of the underlying 
distribution of endowments in society and the limits to social interaction. The next section 
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uses simulation methods to illustrate these patterns and further examine the underlying 
socioeconomic structures of social network formation that affect economic mobility. 
 
6. Simulation of endogenous network formation and economic mobility  
 As the final step towards simulating patterns of endogenous social network 
formation and associated economic mobility, we now develop a specific protocol for 
generating a unique pairwise stable network in a given economy. We then apply this 
protocol to simulate households' resulting long-run equilibria for several randomly 
generated economies. 
 
6.1 Network formation protocol 
 To sort out a unique pairwise stable network, we extend the proposed normal form 
noncooperative game by specifying an algorithm for proposing and accepting links that 
yields a sequential matching process.31 More specifically, every household i can develop a 
set of ranked networks, , by ranking all the feasible networks in based on the 
corresponding indirect utilities. In our matching protocol, households attempt to establish 
their utility maximizing network and therefore interact with others using as their 
best response function as follows.  
Ranked
iΩ iΩ
Ranked
iΩ
 Initially, households consider their top-ranked network. They simultaneously 
propose to each of the other households with which they wish to link. The link between 
two households is established if and only if (i) both agents propose to each other, and (ii) 
at least one of the two partners optimizes its network (i.e., has all of its proposals 
accepted). Once a household optimizes its network, its game is concluded. For any of its 
partners that do not likewise optimize their network, this link is binding. Such partners 
continue to play the game, with their utility maximization now constrained by the link 
commitment. All households that do not optimize their networks in a proposal stage move 
on to the next stage, when they again make simultaneous proposals to each of those 
                                                 
 
31 This specification is in the context of a matching game in the domain of a coalitional game, in which each 
household may be matched with many others. Our matching specification differs greatly, however, from 
Gale and Shapley’s (1962) original approach, which considers a two-sided one-to-one matching game in 
which members of two sides are referred to as Xs and Ys. It also differs from marriage models and 
roommates problem in which individuals can match with only one partner.  
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households still active in the game with whom they wish to link in their top-ranked still-
feasible network (which must include any pre-existing link commitments from prior 
rounds with households that have concluded play). The same link formation rule is 
followed. The game then repeats itself if there remain households without optimized 
networks.  
 If no household can optimize its network in a specific stage, and thus no binding 
link can be established, we assume that the poorest household (i.e., the one with lowest 
A0) has to forego its top-ranked network and instead use its second-best network while the 
rest still play with their top-ranked networks. If still no one can optimize the network, the 
second poorest household then sacrifices its first-best network and must play make link 
proposals to its second-best network while all richer households still play their first-best 
strategy, and so on. The process of sequential matching continues until everyone 
optimizes their networks following the protocol outlined above. For any preferences, the 
process eventually stops because there exists a finite set of households in this economy. 
This ensures the existence of a unique pairwise stable matching (a sub-game perfect 
equilibrium) in this finite extensive form game with perfect information. Figure 4 offers a 
numerical example of this game and its pairwise stable matching for the example 
economy from Figure 3. 
 Note three interesting aspects of this game. First, even if proposals are matched, this 
does not guarantee the establishment of a link. Binding links are established only if (at 
least) one partner optimizes its network. This follows directly from the fact that 
households’ preferences with respect to individual links are governed by their preferences 
over their broader networks, as reflected in . Second, households’ optimal 
networks in equilibrium are not necessarily their first-best ones, due to the interactive 
nature of the link formation process and the spillovers inherent to the process 
economywide. This creates a stark contrast vis-à-vis the optimality conditions that would 
result from unilateral decisions regarding social network structure. Third, the game’s 
Ranked
iΩ
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unique pairwise stable network tends to favor those households able and/or preferring to 
link with a small number of others in the first place.32
  
6.2 Simulation results 
 The analysis assumes 17 households,33 each endowed with randomly 
generated ( , cumulatively representing the economy’s endowment distribution, )
)
00 , SA
( 00 , SAφ . Appendix 1 reports the exact parameterization of this model. Our goal is to 
illustrate the emergence of the distinct patterns of economic mobility and immobility 
among the initially poor we identified earlier. One core point we emphasize is that 
mobility and immobility patterns vary with the socioeconomic structure of the economy 
(represented here by the joint distribution of endowed capital and social network capital). 
Two otherwise identical households, dropped into quite different economies, can follow 
quite different patterns. Economic mobility is thus, at least in part, socially constructed.  
 Figures 5-10 each depict a randomly generated economy. Households are 
represented by their initial endowment positions plotted on the ( )00 , SA  plane. Their long-
run equilibria (either high- or low-level) are represented by the shapes in the plots. A dot 
represents a household that enjoys the high-level equilibrium in period 1, a triangle 
represents a socially isolated household, and an “x” represents a socially excluded one. 
The equilibrium bilateral links are represented by lines connecting two households. In 
each figure, a downward sloping curve reflects the static asset poverty threshold ( )0SA .  
All those to the southwest of that line (shaded in blue) initially (in period 0) choose the 
low-productivity technology. We focus our discussion on this subpopulation, on the 
economic mobility (or immobility) of the initially poor. 
                                                 
 
32 This is illustrated in the simulation statistics in appendix 2.Those for whom no links are feasible or who 
do not wish to establish any social links (i.e., socially isolated households) necessarily always get their first-
best network. Thereafter, the proportion of households attaining their first-best network in equilibrium is 
declining monotonically in desired network size (bottom graphic in appendix 2) and non-monotonically in 
feasible network size (top graphic in appendix 2).  This merely reflects that the more matches one wishes to 
make, the more likely that at least one prospective partner rebuffs one’s link offer.  More complex networks 
are harder to establish. 
33 This arbitrary number was chosen for computational and presentational reasons, to generate a big enough 
population to demonstrate the complex interlinkages, but small enough to display visually and to remain 
tractable in solving the complex matching and optimization problem. 
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 Figure 5 provides a simple illustration of the distinct patterns that emerge from this 
model.34 The initially poor who escape from poverty without forming new social 
networks are represented by the household with initial endowment (3,7). Those who form 
social networks and escape poverty fall into two sub-groups. Some climb out of poverty 
through solidarity among the initially poor (the cluster of the four households with the 
lowest  endowments), while others successfully link to the initially non-poor (the 
household initially endowed with (6,5)). Then there are those who remain trapped in 
poverty, either due to social exclusion (the two households marked “x”) or to self-
imposed social isolation (the three households with the lowest  endowments).  
0S
0A
 Figure 6 then abstracts from the specific households and their links to map the space 
of these different mobility and immobility patterns. The horizontal line at the dynamic 
asset threshold  represents the dynamic asset poverty line in the absence of social 
network capital, as in Carter and Barrett (2006). Those households in area A have a large 
enough endowment of productive assets, , to save in the first period and thereby 
accumulate sufficient traditional capital to reach the high-level equilibrium without 
recourse to social network capital. Some households in region A might nonetheless 
establish social links as a substitute for savings and traditional capital accumulation. But 
households in region A are all independently economically mobile. 
*
oA
0A
 Those households beneath the dynamic asset threshold all require social network 
capital in order to exit poverty. They can be divided into three distinct groups. Those in 
area D, whose initial endowments place them above the static asset poverty line with 
social network capital, 
*
0A
( )0SA , are initially non-poor because of their social network 
capital endowment in spite of their otherwise-insufficient endowment of traditional 
capital.  Not only do they enjoy the high-level equilibrium in period 1, but they are able to 
reach the high-level equilibrium in period 0, unlike those with somewhat greater 
traditional capital but lesser social network capital endowments.  
                                                 
 
34 This particular set of random endowments, which we label “Economy 1”, will be used again in Figures 12 
and 13 to demonstrate particular points. The label is meant to facilitate visual comparison across these 
figures. 
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 The dynamic asset threshold ( )0/ 00*0 =XSA  distinguishes among the final two 
groups. Those in area B are endowed with sufficient social network capital to complement 
productive asset accumulation and escape from poverty, even without forming new social 
links. While social network capital is necessary for their economic mobility, their initial 
endowment suffices to shelter them from depending on others’ willingness to establish 
new links with them. By contrast, others (in area C) can only make it out of poverty if 
they successfully establish new social links and thereby augment their initial social 
network capital endowment as a complement to traditional capital accumulation. This 
group’s economic mobility thus depends fundamentally on the underlying structure of the 
economy, in particular on their social distance from others and the feasible distance over 
which links can form within the economy. Figure 6’s mapping of endowment space thus 
underscores the multiple roles social network capital can play in conditioning household 
economic growth paths, either serving as a substitute for or a complement to traditional 
productive assets, enabling immediate or delayed exit from poverty, and ensuring 
independent, albeit social network-mediated mobility, or requiring the establishment of 
new social links non-cooperatively.   
 Figures 7-10 illustrate clearly the impact of the initial socioeconomic structure of the 
economy on the mobility of the initially poor. Each figure focuses on a distinct type of 
initially poor household – from group A, B or C in Figure 6 – and displays four panels 
that differ solely by the initial distribution of households in the economy. The 
southeastern panel in each figure shows the case of a highly polarized economy, so that 
we can underscore the impact of socio-economic polarization on the economic mobility of 
the poor, a point raised insightfully by Mogues and Carter (2005). 
 Figures 7 and 8 depict the initially poor who are autarkically mobile, in the former 
case irrespective of social network capital, in the case of Figure 8, thanks to their initial 
endowment of social network capital. Neither household a in Figure 7 nor household b in 
Figure 8 need to establish social links in order to climb out of poverty from period 0 to 
period 1. Their ability to reach the high-level equilibrium is thus not affected by structure 
of economy. But their choice as to whether or not to form new links with others varies 
with the underlying structure of the economy in which they find themselves. In the 
(southeastern) case of the polarized economy, neither has any incentive to invest in links 
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with others and thus climbs out of poverty without any new social relationships. In the 
southwestern case in each Figure, they choose to link with other initially poor households 
only, while in the northwestern case in each Figure they choose to link also with initially 
non-poor households. Their social arrangements are the byproduct of the underlying 
endowment distribution in the economy even though they in no sense depend on further 
social relations to reach the high-level equilibrium. This has an important implication for 
empirical studies. The presence in a sample of independently economically mobile 
households who may or may not find it optimal to build social networks can generate 
considerable cross-sample differences in the correlation between household-level 
economic mobility and social network density.    
 Figure 9 illustrates perhaps the most interesting case. Here we see how the 
underlying structure of the economy conditions economic mobility for some of the 
initially poor, those (such as household c) in what Figure 6 labeled area C. In the 
northwestern panel, a link with a socially proximate household that is initially non-poor 
enables socially-mediated exit from poverty. In the northeastern panel, economic mobility 
is achieved through multiple links with other, similarly initially poor households in area 
C. In the lower two panels of Figure 9, however, household c gets trapped in poverty. In 
the southwestern case, there are socially proximate households with which it would like to 
link, but it is rebuffed in its proposal to form a network. The result is social exclusion in 
equilibrium. In the polarized economy35 case, there is no socially proximate household 
with whom a connection would be beneficial, so the household prefers no links and thus 
settles into a socially isolated equilibrium. The subpopulation depicted in Figure 9 is thus 
the group for whom social networks and the underlying structure of society fundamentally 
shape economic mobility (or immobility). 
 Finally, as shown in Figure 10, some households are so destitute initially that they 
almost never find social relations sufficiently beneficial to enable a climb out of poverty.  
They are thus socially isolated in almost all configurations of the economy. The key thing 
to note about social isolation is that, at least under the parameterization we employ, it 
depends primarily on a household’s initial endowment of traditional, productive capital.  
                                                 
 
35 We label this particular initial endowment “Economy 2” for further use in Figure 13. 
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Those who begin too poor simply can’t leverage their meager endowments no matter how 
skillfully they interconnect themselves with others. This is underscored more sharply in 
Figure 11 which plots the results from 100 randomly generated economies. There emerges 
a clear asset threshold below which individuals lose any incentive to establish social 
networks with others. Social exclusion and socially-mediated climbs out of poverty are, 
however, generally quite difficult to predict due to the fact that those patterns depend so 
heavily on the underlying structure of the economy.   
 
7. Crowding-in possibilities created by endogenous social networks 
The endogeneity of social networks can quite fundamentally affect prospective 
interventions by governmental or non-governmental agencies. We illustrate this with 
reference to one specific problem of particular relevance to poverty reduction programs: 
transfers to the poor. Under the maintained (implicit) hypothesis that agents’ social 
networks are exogenously fixed, Cox et al. (1995) and Cox et al. (2004), among others, 
argue that public transfers can crowd out private transfers because the altruistic or 
insurance motivation for a transfer is diminished by public support. Attempts to aid the 
poor could thus be thwarted by induced private responses to public interventions.  
If, however, households’ networks of social relationships are formed endogenously, 
then transfers could change the configuration of networks. Indeed, if social networks are 
endogenous, well-targeted public transfers may have the opposite effect to that posited in 
the existing literature. Transfers can crowd in private support by reducing the social 
distance between individuals and thereby encouraging the creation of new social links, 
enabling recipients to access newfound social network capital and to escape from poverty. 
Such crowding-in effects depend, however, on the structure of the underlying economy, 
reinforcing a core point of the preceding section.  
 We illustrate this crowding-in possibility by repeating the previous simulations, but 
now adding targeted transfers to specific households. Figure 12 visualizes our base case 
without transfers, overlaying four specific households – e, f, g and h – with region C 
identified in figure 6. The upper two rows of Figure 13 then illustrate the possible 
crowding-in effects for four distinct cases of transfers to the households depicted in Figure 
12 – using exactly the same initial endowments, i.e.,  economy 1. The bottom row of 
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Figure 13 presents two different cases of transfers to every poor household in a polarized 
economy (economy 2, previously depicted without transfers in the southeastern quadrant 
of Figure 9).   
 The upper left example in Figure 13 shows the case of a household (e) that was 
previously too poorly endowed with capital to make costly formation of social networks 
attractive. In the absence of a transfer, it therefore chooses social isolation and persistent 
poverty, as shown in Figure 12. But with the benefit of a modest transfer,36 and given the 
social proximity of other households, this transfer encourages e to link to others, enabling 
it to leverage social network capital to escape poverty. Moreover, the induced re-
formation of social networks also permits two other households to escape from poverty.  
These households were socially excluded in the no-transfer economy depicted in Figure 
12 but now are able to band together, using newly created social network capital to access 
the high-level equilibrium in period 1. The central left graphic in Figure 13 shows a 
qualitatively similar result, this time with a 20% smaller transfer (0.8 units of A) because 
the recipient (household g) is more proximate to other households than household e was, 
ex ante, in Figure 12. It therefore requires less of a transfer to induce the creation of new 
social links, and thus an expansion of social network capital that not only lifts the transfer 
recipient out of poverty, but also two other households that would otherwise remain 
persistently poor. Targeting plainly matters, as we emphasize below. 
 The upper right example in Figure 13 shows a similar effect, in this case through a 
one unit transfer to household f, which was socially excluded in the no-transfer setting 
(Figure 12), but now links to three other households, one of which was already able to 
climb out of poverty through autarkic savings, another of which was, like f, socially 
excluded but can leverage its new social link to accumulate enough social network capital 
to climb out of poverty by period 1, and the third of which expands its pre-existing social 
network. 
 Lest it seem that transfers have an automatic beneficial effect in inducing the 
creation of new social network capital, the right central graphic in Figure 13 illustrates 
how even relatively large transfers – 1.5 units of A to household h – can fail to generate 
                                                 
 
36 This transfer is just one unit of A, worth one-quarter of the poor recipient household’s initial capital stock 
and just 0.6% of the wealth of this 17-person economy. 
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poverty reduction gains when they are poorly targeted. Although the transfer brings 
household h right to the threshold of autarkic escape from poverty, makes social linkages 
attractive to it and clearly leaves it better off than it would have been without the transfer, 
h’s relative social distance from other households leave it socially excluded and 
persistently poor even in the wake of a relatively large transfer. 
 Transfers do not have to induce the creation of social links with those who are 
already able to climb out of poverty in order to generate crowding-in effects. Even in a 
highly polarized economy, such as that previously depicted in the lower right quadrant of 
Figure 9, transfers to multiple poor households can stimulate the emergency of a solidarity 
network among the poor that enables several of them to escape poverty. This effect is 
shown in the lower left portion of Figure 13, which simulates the transfer of two units of 
A to each ex ante poor household. This transfer is clearly welfare-improving for all, but 
only facilitates an exit from poverty for some, the five households who establish a 
solidarity network from which they optimally exclude one other poor beneficiary 
household and which three other poor beneficiaries do not wish to join, preferring social 
isolation to costly linkage to the new network.   
 However, the induced social network capital creation effect that stimulates 
economic mobility for some ex ante poor households is by no means automatic. Too 
meager a transfer can improve recipients’ welfare but fail to generate the bigger gains 
associated with a leap to the high-level equilibrium, as illustrated in the lower right 
graphic in Figure 13, which shows the result of transfers to all poor households of just one 
unit of A instead of two units, as in the previous example. Collectively, these examples 
underscore how important core targeting questions – who? how much? – are to the 
poverty reduction effects of transfer programs and how endogenous social network 
formation fundamentally affects the efficacy of such programs. Well-targeted transfers 
can lift even non-recipients out of long-term poverty, while poorly-targeted transfers can 
fail to facilitate economic mobility even for recipients. 
  
8. Conclusions 
Social network capital can be an important facilitator of upward mobility to escape 
persistent poverty. But costly social networking is no panacea. Not all households find it 
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worthwhile to link to others and some will be rebuffed in their efforts to build a network.  
Moreover, the usefulness of social networks depends fundamentally on the underlying 
structure of the economy in which agents reside. In some settings, well-targeted public 
transfers to selected poor households can catalyze the creation of new social network 
capital, thereby multiplying the poverty reduction effects of interventions. 
We illustrate these points by developing a highly stylized model of heterogeneous 
households that make consumption, investment and social networking decisions in a 
dynamic, interlinked setting. Depending on their initial endowment positions, social 
network capital substitutes for productive assets for some households, while for others it 
complements their productive assets in facilitating productivity growth and economic 
mobility.  
One fundamental point that emerges from this exercise is that the exclusionary 
mechanisms necessary for people to be trapped in poverty (Carter and Barrett 2006) may 
arise endogenously due to the inherent costliness of establishing and maintaining social 
links. In our setting, with multiple technologies that create locally increasing returns to 
productive capital but no credit market to permit individuals to borrow the capital 
necessary to exit poverty in time, costless access to social network capital would provide 
an alternate pathway out of poverty, a socially-mediated solution to a market failure.  
When establishing social links is costly, however, some households may opt out of 
networks, choosing social isolation and persistent poverty instead. And when the net 
benefits of social links are asymmetric, other households may desire social links that 
would help them climb out of poverty, but are rebuffed by prospective links and thus left 
in a state of social exclusion and persistent poverty. These social exclusionary 
mechanisms are economy-specific, depending fundamentally on the underlying 
distribution of endowments that determine the net benefits to agents of social links.   
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Figure 1: Locally increasing return production technology  
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Figure 2: Locally increasing return production technology when acquiring more social 
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Figure 3: Example economy with { }5,4,3,2,1=N  and initial distribution ( )00 , SAφ  
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xample of endogenous network formation 
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   The progress of interaction procedure is shown below, “→” stands for “propose to”   
 
       
                Round 1            Round 2       Round 3   
 
HH 1:       2→     No              2→    No        
  
         3→    Match              3→    Match  ⎯⎯⎯ →⎯ destablishe ⎟⎟⎠
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0*
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   HH 2:      3→    No           3→    Match     ⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛=
1
0*
2X  
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   HH 5:                 4→    Match     1*5 =X  
 
Figure 5: Basic simulation illustration 
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Figure 6: The space of social mobility and immobility in one simulated economy 
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Figure 7: Different patterns for an autarkically mobile household 
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Figure 8: Different patterns for a household autarkically mobile given its  0S
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Figure 9: Different patterns for a household whose mobility depends on social links 
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Figure 10: Different patterns for a destitute, economically immobile household 
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Figure 11: Equilibrium social networks and long-run equilibria for 100 economies 
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Figure 12: Households and regions combined in a simulated economy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                A 
 B D  
 
 f  e g 
h 
 C 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
53
Figure 13: Targeted transfers and “crowding in” effects 
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Appendix 1: Parameterization of the simulation 
 
1. Utility: 95.0,1 == ρa  
2. Production function: 9,5.0,25.0,2.1,5.8,9 21321 ====== Fkkk αα  
3. Cost/benefit of link: 5=d , ( ) 33.0,4.0,125.0 321 === θθθ xx  
4. Asset accumulation: 05.0== AS δδ  
5. For each randomly generated economy with ( )00 , SAφ , N=17 with randomly 
generated initial endowments ( )00 , SA :  
[ ]20,00 ∈A  ,    [ ]10,00 ∈S
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Appendix 2: Network simulation statistics 
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